On the second route, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis are expected to participate in talks to stop cross-border attacks. The U.S. is best-placed- of the best-of-the-war-to-encourage Saudi Arabia to reestablish meaningful communication with the Huthis in pursuit of such a such a such agreement. In the midst of this disturbing image, there is good news. In June 2019, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) redrew the bulk of its forces that led the assault on Hodeida and continued to support anti-Huthi Yemeni fighters along the Red Sea coast, easing the threat of a return to major fighting. But this development should not flood policy makers with a false sense of security. The fighting from the front has spread to other parts of the country. Anti-Huthi forces still see Hodeida as a target and may yet resume anhostilities, with devastating consequences. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen, which the UN considers to be the largest in the world, has not deteriorated much since December 2018, but it has not improved. A renewed battle for Hodeida would almost certainly tip the country into widespread famine. Moreover, continued efforts to revive the faltering Hodeida agreement are consuming all available diplomatic bandwidth at great cost, preventing a turn to national-level peace talks. The government`s interpretation of the agreement plays a good role among advocates who view the rebels as deceptive and capable operators, who use negotiations and agreements to reposition themselves before aspiring to further military gains.
[fn] The group cites as an example the 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement (EPA), which called for a gradual withdrawal of Houthi troops from Sanaa in exchange for a series of political concessions, including the formation of a new government. After the signing of the agreement, the Houthis ignored the exit requirement and argued that the men at checkpoints in the streets were not their fighters, but supportive citizens from autonomous “people`s committees.” The Houthis propose a different version that suggests the slow pace of government formation, Hadi`s broken promise on shura reform (Advisory Council) and his attempt to pass a draft constitution based on a six-party federal division that the Houthis had rejected. In January 2015, the rebels placed Hadi under house arrest as their coup plunged an already divided country into a civil war. Crisis Group Middle East Report No.167, Yemen: Is Peace Possible?, 9 February 2016.Hide Footnote But it puts Hadi in the position of advocating for an outcome far from what the two sides agreed to in Sweden. [fn] While some government officials fear that the hawks will go too far, they also see the Stockholm agreement as a political responsibility for Hadi, whose legitimacy is fragile at best in Yemen. Hadi has regained support with his pushback against Griffiths.