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Agreement Has Defined

Although CO2 dominates long-term warming, reducing the warming of ephemeral climate factors (FCLs) such as methane and soot can, in the short term, contribute significantly to limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. A reduction in soot and methane would have considerable benefits (high confidence), including improved health due to reduced air pollution. This in turn improves the institutional and socio-cultural feasibility of such measures. The reduction of several warming LFCS is limited by economic and social feasibility (little evidence, large concordance). Since they are often coded with CO2, reaching the energy, land and urban passages needed to limit warming to 1.5°C would significantly reduce SLCF emissions for warming. {2.3.3.2, 4.3.6} Limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require systemic transformation integrated with sustainable development. Such a change would require increasing and accelerating the implementation of far-reaching, multisectoral and cross-sectoral climate change measures and removing barriers. Such a system change should be combined with complementary adaptation measures, including transformative adaptation, in particular for paths temporarily exceeding 1.5 °C (medium evidence, high compliance) {Chapter 2, Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.4.5, 4.4.5}. Current national reduction and adaptation commitments are not sufficient to stay within the temperature limits set by the Paris Agreement and meet their adaptation targets. While transitions are underway in different countries in the areas of energy efficiency, carbon intensity of fuels, electrification and land-use change, limiting warming to 1.5°C will require greater scale and pace of change to transform energy, rural, urban and industrial systems around the world.

{4.3, 4.4, chapter of the Cross, box 9 in this chapter} Coercion has been defined as a “threat of harm that is made to force a person to do something against his or her will or judgment; in particular, an unlawful threat by a person to impose a manifestation of another person`s apparent misunderstanding on a transaction without real will. [111] An example is in Barton v Armstrong [1976] in a person who was threatened with death if he did not sign the contract. . . .

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